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EXAMINING COOPERATIVE CONVERSION:
AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT NEW YORK
LEGISLATION
I. Introduction
New York City contains ninety-five percent of the cooperative housing units in the United States.' The fundamental reasons for the
proliferation of cooperative housing in New York City are historical,
economic and social. 2 A more specific factor is the New York State
Legislature's support of conversion of residential real estate from
rental to cooperative ownership. 3 This support has taken form in the
most comprehensive set of laws and regulations in the nation dealing
4
with rental apartment conversion to cooperative housing.
The most recent legislation in this area (the "Goodman-Grannis"
bill)- provides a method whereby developers may convert residential
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XI-1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as HUD STUDY].
2. Id.at 2. See notes 35-53 & 59 infra and accompanying text.
3. The legislative finding in three recent bills dealing with conversion of rental
housing to cooperative or condominium housing supports apartment conversion as
sound public policy and a means of "preserving, stabilizing and improving neighbor" 1982 N.Y. Laws ch.
hoods and the supply of sound housing accommodations ..
555, § 1; 1979 N.Y. Laws ch. 432, § 1; 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 544, § 1.
4. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1982-1983), id. §
352-ee to -eeee (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983); N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 18 (1982);
see notes 102-35 & 152-65 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of legislation
in this area. The only federal legislation directly affecting cooperative and condominium conversion is the Condominium and Cooperative Protection and Abuse Relief
Act of 1980 (Title VI, Housing and Community Development Act of 1980), Pub. L.
No. 96-399, 94 Stat. 1672 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3616 (Supp. V 1981)). This
Act encouraged the use of the condominium and cooperative forms of ownership as a
way of meeting the shortage of adequate and affordable multi-family housing
throughout the United States. At the same time, the Act aims at correcting and
preventing abuse of long-term recreational and similar leases. HUD STUDY, supra
note 1, at X-17 n.26. The Condominium and Cooperative Protection and Abuse
Relief Act of 1980 provides very basic protection. This statute requires that tenants
receive adequate notice of conversion and the first opportunity to purchase the units.
All other attempts at federal legislation, including a bill requiring a conversion
moratorium, have failed to pass Congress. See, e.g., Condominium Act of 1979, S.
612, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 4637-45 (1979), and its companion bill
H.R. 2792, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 4702 (1979); H.R. 5175, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 23,134 (1979).
5. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eeee (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983). New York
State Senator Goodman and Assemblyman Grannis are two major sponsors of this
legislation.
IMPACTS:
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rental housing in New York City to cooperative housing without
obtaining an agreement to purchase a cooperative apartment from
any of the existing tenants." Under this method, tenants who do not
desire to purchase their apartments as cooperatives may remain in the
targeted building indefinitely. 7 In order to initiate this "noneviction"
plan, a developer must be able to show that potential purchaserstenant or non-tenant-will purchase at least fifteen percent of the
apartment units in a targeted building." The only legal obligation of
these potential purchasers is to indicate a desire to move into the
purchased apartment when and if it becomes vacant." As a result of
this procedure, landlord-developers may convert rental units to cooperative units without having to confront either individual tenants or
tenant organizations. 10
By contrast, the "noneviction" procedure for cooperative conversion in Nassau, Rockland and Westchester Counties requires that a
developer be able to show that existing tenants will purchase at least
fifteen percent of the apartment units in a targeted building.' In these
counties, non-tenant purchasers cannot be included in the fifteen
percent requirement. 12
In New York City, the eviction approach to cooperative conversion
allows a landlord-developer to evict non-purchasing tenants when at
least fifty-one percent of the tenants agree to purchase their apartments. 3 The non-purchasing tenants have the longer of three years or
the expiration of their lease to vacate their apartments once an eviction type of cooperative conversion has been approved by the New
York State Attorney General's office.14
Despite the fact that the noneviction approach of Goodman-Grannis is less harsh on New York City tenants than an eviction scheme, the
ability of a landlord-developer to convert rental units without tenant
support has been criticized. Specifically, the Goodman-Grannis legislation may result in increased tenant harassment, 5 an increase in the

6. Id. § 352-eeee(1)(b), (d), (2)(c)(i).
7. Id. § 352-eeee(2)(c)(ii), (vi).
8. Id. § 352-eeee(1)(b), (d), (2)(c)(i).
.9. Id. § 352-eeee(1)(b), (2)(c)(i).
10. "[W]ithout such an insider percentage sponsors can ignore the tenants' demands as long as there is a market for outside purchasers, many of whom buy not
because they want a place to live but for speculative reasons." McKee, How the City
Got A New Co-op Law, CITY LIMITS, Aug.-Sept. 1982, at 26.
11. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eee(1)(b), (8) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
12. Id.
13. Id. § 352-eeee(1)(c).
14. Id. § 352-eeee(2)(d)(ii).
15. See notes 159 & 161-62 inJra and accompanying text.
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number of buildings left unattended through apartment speculation,'
7
and the undermining of rent regulations.1
This Note will discuss the impact of the Goodman-Grannis legislation on tenant and landlord interests in the cooperative conversion
process in New York City. Initially, cooperative housing will be defined in terms of its relationship to condominium ownership. In addition, the development of cooperative housing will be explored. Finally, relevant New York case law and the framework of cooperative
conversion in New York State will be examined. This Note concludes
that the ability of landlord-developers to meet the fifteen percent
requirement of the Goodman-Grannis noneviction approach by the
use of non-tenant purchasers leaves existing tenants without any leverage in the conversion process. Accordingly, adequate protection of
New York City residents requires landlord-developers to meet the
fifteen percent requirement solely from existing tenants.
II. Cooperative Housing and Cooperative Conversion
The most common form of cooperative housing in the United States
and the type most frequently used in New York State is the corporate
form.' 8 Title to the entire premises is vested in a corporation leasing
specific apartments to the tenant.' 9 Three essential documents are
necessary to create a cooperative corporate organization: (1) a corporate charter or certificate of incorporation, (2) a set of by-laws and (3)
a proprietary lease or occupancy agreement (certificate of membership) .20 These documents constitute the contract between the tenants
and the corporation. 21 A proprietary lease sets forth the number of
shares of the lessor corporation owned by the tenant-shareholder. 22
16. See notes 159 & 163-64 infra and accompanying text.
17. See note 165 infra and accompanying text.

18. 2 P.

ROHAN &

M.

RESNICK, COOPERATIVE HOUSING,

LAW AND PRACTICE §

2.01[i], at 2-2.1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as ROHAN & RESNICK]; C. SMITH & R.
BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 445, 446 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SMITH &
BOYER]. Prior to the advent of condominium living the term cooperative was used to
mean several types of organizations where occupants of individual units of a multifamily structure sought to acquire advantages of joint ownership. Id.; note that § 352
of the New York General Business Law does not contain a general statutory definition of a cooperative corporation. See ROHAN & RESNICK, supra, § 5A.03, at 5A-12
n.18. However, the New York Cooperative Corporation Law does give a general
definition of a non-profit cooperative corporation. N.Y. Coop. CORP. LAW § 3(c)-(d)
(McKinney 1951 & SuPp. 1982-1983). See I.R.C. § 216(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) for
the Internal Revenue Service definition.
19. ROHAN & RESNICK, supra note 18, § 2.01[4], at 2-8.
20. Id.; see N.Y. Coop. CORP. LAW §§ 11, 16, 40 (McKinney 1951 & Supp. 19821983).
21. ROHAN & RESNICK, supra note 18, § 2.01[4], at 2-8.

22. Id.
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These shares entitle the owner to the issuance of a proprietary lease. It
is the proprietary lease which gives the tenant-shareholder the right to
23
occupy a particular apartment or unit for a stated term.
24
By contrast, condominium units are separately owned entities.
Each wholly owned apartment is considered real property. 25 In addition, each owner possesses an undivided share in the common areas of
the condominium complex.26 The three basic documents required to
create a new condominium are: (1) a declaration or master deed, (2)
by-laws for governing the condominium association and the operation
27
of the building and (3) a deed to the individual units.
Condominium owners must acquire their own mortgage loans for
their individually owned units. 28 In addition, owners pay real estate
taxes on their own units. 29 By contrast, the shares of stock in a corporation purchased by an owner of cooperative housing are personal
property. 30 Moreover, a single mortgage is executed for the entire
corporation. 3' Accordingly, shareholders pay a portion of mortgage
payments, as well as taxes, in relation to the number of shares of the
corporation held. 32 Both cooperative and condominium housing owners, however, are treated similarly with respect to the ability to de33
duct interest on mortgage payments from income for tax purposes,
34
and the possession of equity in one's home.
III. The Development of Cooperative Housing in New York City
Cooperative housing in New York City dates back to the early
1900's. 35 This long history has familiarized lawyers, lending institu23. Id. at 2-9.
24. Id. § 1.02[3], at 1-5.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 1 P. ROHAN & M. RESNICK, CONDOMINIUM LAW & PRACTICE § 7.01, at 7-1
(1982); see N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339(n), (u), (v), (o) (McKinney 1968 & Supp.
1982-1983); see generally Levine, Registeringa Condominium Offering in New York,
19 N.Y.L.F. 495 (1974) (discussion of the New York State Condominium Act).
28. ROHAN & RESNICK, supra note 18, § 1.02[3], at 1-5.
29. Id.
30. ROHAN & RESNICK, supra note 18, § 1.03, at 1-7. The cooperator buys shares
of stock in a corporation and obtains a lease to an apartment. The shares of stock are
considered personal property (choses in action) and the lease a contract for the "use"
of real property, but not itself a real property interest. Id.
31. Id. § 1.02[3], at 1-6.
32. SMITH & BOYEa, supra note 18, at 447.
33. I.R.C. § 163 (a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
34. SMITH & BOYER, supra note 18, at 445.
35. 2
HOUSING
REPORT].

REPORT OF THE NEW

YORK STATE

TEMPORARY COMMISSION

ch. 2, app. A, at 30 (1980) [hereinafter cited as

ON

RENTAL

RENTAL HOUSING COMM'N
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tions and the public with cooperative ownership. 36 After a difficult
period in the 1930's when many cooperatives failed financially, cooperative housing development had a resurgence in the post World War
Two period. 37 This resurgence has continued to the present day. 38
The advent of rent control regulations in New York City helped
40
39
spur the development of cooperative housing. These regulations
have restricted free market returns on investment and encouraged

The original cooperators were wealthy business people who viewed the
cooperative corporation as a business arrangement. They were familiar
with securities transactions, and the cooperative was considered one of the
important investments of their lives .... The first cooperative buildings
provided more than shelter. They were social clubs with a great emphasis
on snob appeal. The residents formed the cooperative to control who lived
with them, and to be assured that high standards were maintained in the
building.
Id. at 30-31.
36. Id. at 52.
37. Id. at 30.
38. See Offering Plans Submitted to the New York State Department of Law,
Real Estate Financing Bureau (available in the New York State Attorney General's
Office):
OFFERING PLANS SUBMITTED TO THE NEW YORK STATE
DEPARTMENT OF LAW REAL ESTATE FINANCING BUREAU
1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

167

300

397

667

758

993

67

143

270

501

596

667

Total of
All Plans
Cooperative
conversion
Plans
Only

OFFERING PLANS FILED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF LAW
1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

121

249

295

386

474

634

44

126-

180

261

347

327

Total of
All Plans
Cooperative
conversion
Plans
Only

HOUSING COMM'N REPORT, supra note 35, ch. 2, app. A, at 28.
40. For a brief synopsis of New York City Rent Regulations, see 1 RENTAL
HOUSING COMM'N REPORT,supra note 35, ch. 1, at 64-80, 94-95. The New York Local
Emergency Housing Rent Control Act, (codified at N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 86018617 (McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1982-1983)) empowered New York City to create its
own rent control program. New York City adopted a rent control program, the New

39. 2 RENTAL
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owners to convert their buildings to cooperative apartments. 41 In
addition, yield from the sale of apartments as cooperative units has
proven significantly greater than where a rental apartment building is
42
marketed to a single investor or successor landlord.
Cooperative housing, in comparison to condominium housing, has
an additional tax benefit. Sales of cooperatives are more likely to be
taxed on the profit from the sale at the lower capital gains rate, rather
than as ordinary income. 43 Another economic incentive for the landlord of residential rental housing to convert to cooperative housing is
the fact that the cooperative affords greater flexibility in financing
than the condominium. Landlord-developers may vary the mortgage
down payment requirements so as to make cooperative housing fall
within the means of a greater number of individuals. 44 In addition,
cooperative apartment financing is made easier because New York
State banks are authorized to make loans on the pledge of an owner's
45
stock and lease.
Converters to cooperative housing also benefit from permanent
blanket financing. 46 If the existing mortgage on a building is at a low

York City Rent and Rehabilitation Law, in 1962. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit.
Y, §§ Y51-1.0 to 18.0 (1975 & Supp. 1982-1983), reprinted in N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS
tit. 23, ch. 4 app. at 371 (McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1982-1983). The Rent Stabilization Law was adopted by New York City in 1969. NEW YORK, N. Y. ADMIN. CODE tit.
YY, § YY51-1.0 to 8.0 (1975 & Supp. 1982-1983), reprinted in N.Y. UNCONSOL.
LAWS tit. 23, ch. 4 app. at 587 (McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1982-1983). In general, rent
control covers apartments constructed prior to February 1, 1947 and rent stabilization apartments constructed after February 1, 1947. The Rent Stabilization Law has
been extended to March 31, 1985. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. YY, § YY 51-8.0
(1975 & Supp. 1982-1983), reprinted in N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS tit. 23, ch. 4 app. at
130 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983). The New York City Rent and Rehabilitation Law
was extended to June 30, 1983 pursuant to the N.Y. Local Emergency Rent Control
Act, 1981 N.Y. Laws ch. 383, § 1, reprintedin N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 8582 note at
12 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
41. ROHAN & RESNICK, supra note 18, § 6.09[1], at 6-73.
42. Id.
43. Id. § 6.02, at 6-5; see I.R.C. § 64 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (ordinary income),
id. § 1202 (capital gains taxation rate). See Comment, Tax Aspects of Choosing
Between A Cooperative or Condominium Conversion, 12 CUM. L. REV. 453 (1982).
The author concludes that the cooperative method is more likely to produce long
term capital gain treatment. Id. at 483; see generally Spandorf, Capital Gain Opportunitiesfor Sponsors of Co-ops and Condominiums, 31 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1855
(1973) (discussion of capital gains taxation treatment available to sponsors of cooperative or condominium housing).
44. See 2 RENTAL HousING COMM'N REPORT, supra note 35, ch. 2, at 2-16.
45. A cooperative housing loan may be "secured... by an assignment or transfer of the stock or other evidence of an ownership interest .... .. N.Y. BANKING LAW
§ 235 (8-a) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
46. Permanent blanket financing refers to an entire housing cooperative being
covered by one mortgage. ROHAN & RESNICK, supra note 18, § 1.02[3], at 1-6; id.
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interest rate, the mortgage may be left on the building when it is
transferred to the cooperative corporation. This is not available in a
condominium conversion, since each individual condominium unit
has its own mortgage agreement. 47 An underlying cooperative blanket
mortgage also makes easier any assessments for capital improvements. 48 By contrast, owners of individual condominium units must
be assessed separately. 49 It has been argued that the assessment procedures in a condominium complex may generate conflict among individual owners.5 0
Certain lending practices and regulations have contributed to the
growth in cooperative conversion. In 1971, lending institutions in
New York State were permitted to charge an interest rate of 1.5%
above the general usury rate for loans for cooperative housing. 5 ' This
provision was enacted as a result of New York State's recognition of
the need to encourage bank financing of cooperative loans. 52 The
regulation may have been based on the theory that lenders are at
greater risk in providing cooperative loans. 53 There may be a high risk
of default where many apartments are sold to investors who have
given small cash downpayments and have no intention to live in the
units.5 4 Foreclosure may occur even where many tenants are making
required payments. 55 Accordingly, the higher interest rates were a
§ 5.01[2], at 5-2 to 5-2.1. This is in contrast to condominium housing where each
purchaser arranges his own individual unit financing. Id. § 5.0112], at 5-2.1 to 5-3.
47. Id., § 6.03, at 6-7. In a condominium conversion favorable mortgages are
lost because the property must be free and clear at the time of the conversion since
mortgages are to be placed solely on the individual units. Id.
The substantial discount that a tenant purchaser may receive is an additional
feature making cooperative housing attractive. See 2 RENTAL HOUSING COMM'N
REPORT, supra note 18, ch. 2, at 2-11; HUD STUDY, supra note 1, app. 1. at 219.
Discounts of up to 60 % below market value are offered to tenants when the conversion is an eviction-type plan. Id.
48. HUD STUDY, supra note 1, app. 1, at 223; see 2 RENTAL HOUSING COMM'N
REPORT, supra note 35, ch. 2, app. A, at 32-33. "In New York City cooperatives,
where many of the buildings are older structures potentially in need of major or
minor repair, the ability to raise money quickly and efficiently is considered an
important requirement. The cooperative offers this mechanism through the underlying blanket mortgage." Id.
49. HUD STUDY, supra note 1, app. 1, at 223.
50. Id.
51. NEW YORK BANKING LAW § 235 (8-a) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
52. 2 RENTAL HOUSING COMM'N REPORT, supra note 35, ch. 2, app. A, at 32;
ROHAN & RESNICK, supra note 18, § 5A.02, at 5A-2 to 5A-3.
53. See Henry, Lenders Lowering the Rates, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1982, § 8
(Real Estate), at 1, col. 1, 12, col. 1-2.
54. Henry, supra note 53, at 12, col. 2.
55. This may make cooperative housing loans less attractive for lending institutions. Interview with Robert Zinman, Vice President and Investment Counsel, Met-
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necessary incentive for banks to provide loans for cooperative housing.
While the federal government has preempted the New York State
usury law in the area of initial financing of a residential housing
cooperative by permitting unlimited usury rates,56 a premium is still
charged on cooperative loans. 57 This practice continues despite the
fact that since World War Two there has not been a default of a
58
cooperative.
To a lesser extent, the desire for control over choice of one's neighbors was important at the genesis of cooperatives and remains so
today.59 Initially, cooperatives did not represent a mere dwelling
place. Cooperative buildings were similar to clubs which excluded
certain people to maintain their "high standards." 0 While this selectivity still exists in the form of a cooperative association's control over
the selection of prospective purchasers, reasons for rejection may not
be violative of federal, state and local civil rights statutes.6 '

ropolitan Life Insurance Company and Adjunct Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law (Dec. 1982). Since individual members of a cooperative cannot
have their apartments free and clear of a mortgage, on default of a cooperative
mortgage the equities of the individual owners are liquidated at foreclosure. Unless
solvent cooperators assume the assessments of the insolvent cooperators, they lose
their units as a result of foreclosure. ROHAN & RESNICK, supra note 18, § 5.01[2], at 53.
56. 12 U.S.C. § 1735 (f-7) (Supp. IV 1980). This probably does not apply to
criminal usury rates which are applicable except for loans in the amount of $2.5

million or more. N.Y.

GEN. OBLIG. LAW

§ 5-501(6)(b) (McKinney 1978 & Supp.

1982-1983). However, the refinancing of a loan is still covered by state usury law
which currently limits interest rates to 16% per year. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 14-a(1)
(McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1982-1983).
57. Under New York State law a premium of 1.5% is still permitted for cooperative loans. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 235(8-a) (McKinney 1971 & 1982-1983); Henry,
supra note 53, at 12, col. 4. It is a difficult habit to break. Id.
58. Henry, supra note 53, at 12, col. 4. According to some observers only one
building has defaulted in the history of New York cooperatives. HUD STUDY, supra
note 1, app. 1, at 223. The increased number of offering plans for cooperatives
submitted to the New York State Attorney General's office indicates that interest
rates have not discouraged the development of cooperative housing. See note 38
supra and accompanying text. This may be due in part to the 1971 law permitting
savings banks to make personal loans for cooperative housing; see 2 RENTAL HoUsING
COMM'N REPORT, supra note 35, ch. 2, app. A, at 32. As a result of this law, lenders
were encouraged to make cooperative loans. Henry, supra note 53, at 12, col. 4.
Prior to 1971 there was no such thing as a co-op mortgage. Regulations prohibited
various types of banks from offering long-term loans to cooperatives. Id.
59, 2 RENTAL HousING COMM'N REPORT, supra note 35, ch. 2, app. A, at 30-31.
60. Id. Today, the exclusivity still exists but rather than excluding people cooperative boards "include" people that they choose. Id.
61. Id. at 52. A typical reason for rejection includes financial ability. Note that
the power to accept or reject prospective purchasers is not usually considered available to owners of condominium units. HUD STUDY, supra note 1, app. 1, at 222-23.
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IV. Cooperative Housing Conversions Plans and Procedures
When converting to or creating cooperative housing,6 2 the sponsor
of the housing unit(s) must meet the requirements of the New York
State General Business Law and rules and regulations promulgated by
the Attorney General. 63 These conversion procedures are the most
elaborate in the United States.6 4 A sponsor first submits a proposed
filing to the New York State Attorney General's office.6 5 The proposal
must include certain information on selling prices, a description of the
building, engineering reports, and an affidavit that there are no excessive long-term vacancies.66 Second, within four to six months after the
sponsor submits an offering plan, the Attorney General's office either
accepts the plan or requests the sponsor to make certain amendments
to the plan.6 7 If accepted, the plan is considered "filed" by the Attorney General. 68 Finally, after the proposal is filed, the sponsor can
begin to solicit tenants to purchase apartments.6 9

62. ROHAN & RESNICK, supra note 18, § 6.03, at 6-6. One distinction between
newly created cooperative housing units and conversion from existing residential
rental housing to cooperative housing units is that new creation requires finding a
building site and procuring construction financing while conversion to cooperative
housing may require eviction of prior tenants. Id. at 6-6 to 6-7.
63. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1982-1983), id. § 352ee to 352-eeee (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983); N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 18 (1982).
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that federal securities laws do not
apply to cooperative units. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S.
837, 847-48 (1975). See also Grenader v. Spitz, 537 F.2d 612, 613 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1009 (1976). Grenaderinterpreted Forman to mean that cooperative shares were neither securities nor investment contracts within the meaning of the
securities laws. Id. at 616, 619.
64. 2 RENTAL HOUSING COMM'N REPORT, supra note 35, ch. 2, at 2-14.

65. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 18.3(a)(11), (a)(12) (1982). The offering plan
must indicate whether it is an eviction or noneviction plan. N.Y. GEN Bus. LAW §
352-eeee 2(b) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983); N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 18.3(a)(1),
(2) (1982).
66. N.Y..ADMIN.

CODE tit. 13,

§§

18.1(g), 18.2(c)(4), 18.3(d)(1), (e), 18.7 (1982);

N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e(l)(b), (6) (McKinney 1978). An excessive long-term
vacancy occurs when a sponsor of a cooperative conversion reduces the number of
actual purchasers necessary to approve an eviction plan by keeping apartments
unoccupied by bona fide tenants for more than five months prior to submission of the
offering plan. "Excessive" is defined as the greater of a vacancy rate in excess of 10 %
or having vacancies twice the average vacancy rate for the building for two years
prior to the submission of the offering plan to the Attorney General's office. N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eeee(2)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983); N.Y. ADMIN. CODE

tit. 13,
67.
68.
69.
(1982).

§ 18.1(g) (1982).
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e(2) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
Id.
Id. § 352-e(2), (5) (McKinney 1968); N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 18.3(a)(12)
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Rental housing is converted to cooperative apartments by eviction
and noneviction plans. Conversion eviction plans now require that at
least fifty-one percent of the tenants agree to purchase their apartments. 70 If the minimum number of tenants agree to purchase, then
the remaining tenants are subject to eviction within the longer of three
years from the date the conversion eviction plan is declared effective
by the Attorney General or the expiration of the tenant's lease. 71
70. The "eviction plan" is defined as:
A plan which, pursuant to the provisions of this section, can result in the
eviction of a non-purchasing tenant by reason of the tenant failing to
purchase pursuant thereto, and which may not be declared effective until
at least fifty-one percent of the bona fide tenants in occupancy of all
dwelling units in the building or group of buildings or development on the
date the offering statement or prospectus was accepted for filing by the
attorney general (excluding, for the purposes of determining the number
of bona fide tenants in occupancy on such date, eligible senior citizens and
eligible disabled persons) shall have executed and delivered written agreements to purchase under the plan pursuant to an offering made in good
faith without fraud and with no discriminatory repurchase agreements or
other discriminatory inducements.
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eeee(1)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
Under Rent Stabilization and Rent Control laws which were applicable prior to
passage of Goodman-Grannis, an eviction type plan of cooperative conversion required that at least 35% of tenants agree to purchase their apartments in order for
said eviction plan to be declared effective by the Attorney General. NEW YORK, N.Y.
ADMIN. ConE tit. YY51-6.0, § (c)(9)(a)(1975), reprintedin N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS tit.
23, ch. 4 app. at 599 (McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1982-1983), amended by 1982 N.Y.
Laws ch. 555, § 7, codified in N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eeee note at 34 (McKinney
Supp. 1982-1983); New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations § 55(c)(3)(a),
reprinted in N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS tit. 23, ch. 4 app. at 543 (McKinney 1974).
71. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eeee(2)(d)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983). This,
of course, is exclusive of groups exempted under § 352-eeee of the General Business
Law, senior citizens and the eligible handicapped. Exempt senior citizens are defined
as non-purchasing tenants
who are sixty-two years of age or older on the date the attorney general has
accepted the plan for filing, and the spouses of any such tenants on such
date, and who have elected, within sixty days of the date of the attorney
general has accepted the plan for filing, on forms promulgated by the
attorney general and presented to such tenants by the offeror, to become
non-purchasing tenants under the provisions of this section; provided that
such election shall not preclude any such tenant from subsequently purchasing the dwelling unit on the terms then offered to tenants in occupancy.
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eeee(1)(f) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
Exempt disabled persons are defined as
non-purchasing tenants who have an impairment which results from anatomical, physiological or psychological conditions, other than addiction to
alcohol, gambling, or any controlled substance, which are demonstrable
by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, and
which are expected to be permanent and which prevent the tenant from
engaging in any substantial gainful employment on the date the attorney
general. has accepted the plan for filing, and the spouses of any such
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Sponsors of noneviction plans 72 are required only to attain tenant or
outside purchasers for fifteen percent of the apartments in the building undergoing conversion. 73 The General Business Law requires that
non-resident purchasers, or one or more of their immediate family,
intend to reside in the purchased apartment when it becomes vacant.7 4 Non-purchasing tenants are entitled to stay in their apartments
indefinitely. These tenants, if previously subject to governmental regulation, continue to be covered by statutory rent regulations. 75 However, that is not true for those who begin to rent an apartment after a
building has been converted. 76 As a result, landlord-developers can
tenants on such date, and who have elected, within sixty days of the date
the attorney general has accepted the plan for filing, on forms promulgated by the attorney general and presented to such tenants by the offeror,
to become non-purchasing tenants under the provisions of this section;
provided, however, that if the disability first occurs after acceptance of
the plan for filing, then such election may be made within sixty days
following the onset of such disability unless during the period subsequent
to sixty days following the acceptance of the plan for filing but prior to
such election, the offeror accepts a written agreement to purchase the
apartment from a bona fide purchaser; and provided further that such
election shall not preclude any such tenant from subsequently purchasing
the dwelling unit or the shares allocated thereto on the terms then offered
to tenants in occupancy.
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eeee(1)(g) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
72. A "noneviction" plan is defined as:
A plan which may not be declared effective until written purchase agreements have been executed and delivered for at least fifteen percent of all
dwelling units in the building or group of buildings or development by
bona fide tenants in occupancy or bona fide purchasers who represent that
they intend that they or one or more members of their immediate family
intend to occupy the unit when it becomes vacant.
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW 352-eeee(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
73. Id.
74. Id. According to the Attorney General's office, outside purchasers must
provide a sworn affidavit of their intent, which is difficult to monitor. Interview
with Jane Rosenberg, Assistant Attorney General, Real Estate Financing Bureau,
New York State Dep't of Law, in New York City (Sept. 13, 1982). In effect the
outside purchaser is signing an affidavit that he is not a speculator. McKee, supra
note 10, at 28.
75. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eeee(2)(c)(iii) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
76. The Attorney General's office has stated that the Conciliation and Appeals

Board, operating under the Rent Stabilization Law,

NEW YORK,

N.Y.

ADMIN CODE

tit. YY, § YY51-3.0 (1975 & Supp.. 1982-1983), reprinted in N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS
tit. 23, ch. 4 app. at 589 (McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1982-1983), has not asserted
jurisdiction over those who begin to rent an apartment in a building once it is
converted to cooperative housing. Interview with Jane Rosenberg, Assistant Attorney
General, Real Estate Financing Bureau, New York State Dep't of Law, in New York
City (Sept. 13, 1982).
Those tenants living in a cooperative who opted not to purchase and who were not
subject to governmental regulation or where such government regulation is eliminated after a conversion plan has been accepted for filing by the Attorney General's
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effectively circumvent the rent control regulations after converting
only fifteen percent of the apartments in a building.
The courts have interpreted the Attorney General's responsibility as
limited to the scrutinization of apartment conversion offering plans
for omission of material facts. 77 However, the Attorney General has
the discretion to investigate the truthfulness of the representations
included in the prospectus or offering statement.78 The Attorney General also has both civil and criminal powers of subpoena over those
involved in the conversion or creation process. 9
The New York Court of Appeals, however, has stated that the
courts retain their traditional powers to hear suits against a sponsor of
a cooperative offering plan.80 However, suits against the Attorney
General based on the sufficiency of the content and language of the
plan, a determination as to compliance with disclosure requirements,
acceptance or refusal of an offering plan, or defects not constituting
independent actionable wrongs, can be brought only through an Article 78 proceeding based on the arbitrary and capricious nature of the
Attorney General's determination.8 1 Success in Article 78 proceedings
office are protected from "unconscionable increases beyond ordinary rentals for
comparable apartments during the period of their occupancy." N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW
§ 352-eeee(2)(c)(iv).
77. Wallach v. Abrams, 108 Misc. 2d 25, 26, 436 N.Y.S.2d 916, 917 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1980). Section 352-e of the New York General Business Law is a full
disclosure consumer protection oriented statute that does not provide substantive
protection. 2 RENTAL HOUSING COMM'N REPORT, supra note 35, ch. 2, at 2-14. Thus,
the Attorney General's role is limited to full disclosure of all relevant facts and does
not extend to substantive regulations (i.e., the Attorney General is not required to
look into the accuracy of information submitted). Id. The Attorney General is under
no obligation to investigate the facts. Whalen v. Lefkowitz, 36 N.Y.2d 75, 78, 324
N.E.2d 536, 538-39, 365 N.Y.S.2d 150, 153 (1975). Note however that omission of
material facts and fraudulent representations in real estate syndication offerings are
made illegal. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e(1)(a)(b) (McKinney 1968).
78. Whalen v. Lefkowitz, 36 N.Y.2d 75, 79, 324 N.E.2d 536, 538-39, 365
N.Y.S.2d 150, 153 (1975).
79. Greenthal v. Lefkowitz, 32 N.Y.2d 457, 462-63, 299 N.E.2d 657, 658-59, 346
N.Y.S.2d 234, 236-37 (1973) (citing N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352(1)-(2) (McKinney
1968)). The Attorney General is authorized to start an investigation and is given full
authority to use subpoena power. Greenthal, 32 N.Y.2d at 463, 299 N.E.2d at 659,
346 N.Y.S.2d at 237 (citing N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352(1), (2) (McKinney 1968)).
The Greenthalcourt concluded that in addition to investigatory and subpoena power
the Attorney General can utilize "appropriate civil or criminal follow-up procedures
when wrongdoing, in fact, is found." 32 N.Y.2d at 463, 299 N.E.2d at 659, 346
N.Y.S.2d at 237.
80. Richards v. Kaskel, 32 N.Y.2d 524, 533 n.5, 300 N.E.2d 388, 393 n.5, 347
N.Y.S.2d 1, 8 n.5 (1973) (dictum).
81. Schumann v. 250 Tenants Corp., 65 Misc. 2d 253, 256-57, 317 N.Y.S.2d 500,
504-05 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1970). Examples of wrongs not constituting independent actionable wrongs are omissions, indefiniteness, insufficient detail, and inap-
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has been made extremely difficult by the court of appeal's decision in
In re Parkchester.82 In that case, the Court held that the Attorney
General's office can accept or reject a sponsor's application on rather
superficial grounds if the Attorney General decides not to conduct an
investigation of the application. 83 In a companion case, 4 the court of
appeals concluded that the Attorney General was not required to look
into alleged irregularities in an apartment conversion offering plan
presented for filing; nor could the tenants successfully seek to annul
the determination of the Attorney General in accepting the plan if it
appeared proper.8 5 As a result of these decisions, it appears that the
Attorney General is not required to look beyond statements in the plan
86
and can rely upon the appearance of truthfulness.
Despite a recession and high interest rates, the number of offering
plans submitted for conversion to cooperative housing units have increased ten times since 1976 in New York State. 7 Most of this increase
occurred in New York City. 88 In addition, there exists a trend toward

propriate language. Id. at 257, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 505. Another action deemed to be
exclusively within the Attorney General's authority and therefore subject to an
Article 78 proceeding is the Attorney General's decision whether to begin criminal
proceedings or seek an injunction related to matters arising out of a cooperative
housing conversion. Id. at 256, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 504. The courts, however, are
deemed to retain jurisdiction on matters relating to fraud, deceit, misrepresentation
and breach of fiduciary obligations. Id. at 257, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 505.
82. Parkchester Apts. Co. v. Lefkowitz, 44 A.D.2d 442, 355 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1st
Dep't 1974), aft'd, 36 N.Y.2d 688, 325 N.E.2d 870, 366 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1975); ROHAN
& RESNICK, supra note 18, § 6.04, at 6-15. The authors conclude that as a result of the
Parkchester decision, the Attorney General does not have to go beyond surface
statements if the Attorney General's office chooses not to investigate further. Id.; see
note 77 supra and accompanying text.
83. 44 A.D.2d at 444-45, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
84. Whalen v. Lefkowitz, 36 N.Y.2d 75, 324 N.E.2d 536, 365 N.Y.S.2d 150
(1975).
85. Id. at 78, 324 N.E.2d at 538, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
86. See Parkchester, 44 A.D.2d at 444-45, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 595; Whalen v.
Lefkowitz, 36 N.Y.2d at 78, 324 N.E.2d at 538, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
87. Offering Plans Submitted to the New York State Department of Law, Real
Estate Financing Bureau (available in Attorney General's office); see note 38 supra.
Submissions of offering plans in New York State for both condominium and cooperative conversions increased in 1981 from the preceding year. Id. Many commentators
attribute the low numbers of apartment conversion plans submitted during the 1974
to 1977 period to the inflexibility of the Goodman-Dearie legislation which required
35 % of occupied units to purchase their apartments in either an eviction or noneviction plan of conversion. 2 RENTAL HouSING COMM'N REPORT, supra note 35, at 2-135
to 2-137 n.7; E. Lehner & D. Sweet, Goodman-Dearie Expiration Leaves Coop
Conversion Radically Altered, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 16, 1977, at 25, col. 1.
88. HUD STUDY, supra note 1, app. 1, at 220. Within New York City most
conversions have occurred in Manhattan. Id.
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noneviction as opposed to eviction plans."" The focus of concern regarding conversion plans is on the tenants who are unable or unwilling to purchase their apartments. Critics claim that rental apartment
conversion depletes available rental stock and increases the demand
for rental housing. This occurs because tenants are forced into the
market place for rental apartments.9 0
According to a report of the New York Temporary State Commission on Living Costs and the Economy, 9 ' the conversion of rental units
to cooperative housing is "generally a socially unproductive investment of capital.... "92 The Commission, headed by then Assemblyman Andrew Stein,9 3 objected to conversion because of the potential
warehousing of apartments and eviction of tenants.9 4 To a great ex89. 2 RENTAL HOUSING COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, ch. 2 at 2-18, 2-27; Oser,
Protections Widened in New York Conversions, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1982, § 8 (Real
Estate), at 7, col. 1; Oser, Noneviction Method Adds to Complexity of Conversions,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1980, at 13, col. 1. In the early 1970's David Clurman, the
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Real Estate Financing Bureau in the
Attorney General's office, devised the noneviction method of converting rental buildings to cooperative or condominium ownership. Id. His successors also encouraged
the noneviction approach to building conversion. Id., col. 3. In particular, Harold A.
Lubell, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Real Estate Financing Bureau in
the late 1970's, said the noneviction approach to conversion is more acceptable
socially and may be beneficial to the sponsor who can thereby spread his taxable
income over a number of years. Id. While owners may have resisted noneviction
conversion initially, they eventually concluded that it was a viable alternative. 2
RENTAL HOUSING COMM'N REPORT, supra note 35, ch. 2, at 2-135 n.7 (citing a letter
from Arthur S. Levine, former Assistant Attorney General in charge of The Real
Estate Financing Bureau to the New York State Temporary Commission on Rental
Housing (Mar. 15, 1979)).
90. 2 RENTAL HOUSING COMM'N REPORT, supra note 35, ch. 2, at 2-152; Abrams
Would Tighten Co-op Conversion Laws, N.Y. Times, May 23, 1981, at 27, col. 5. In
this article the late Congressman Benjamin Rosenthal indicated his concern about the
future of affordable rental housing in New York City. His solution was a national
moratorium on conversions; cf. Oser, Conversion to Cooperativesfor Housing in the
City, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1980, § 2, at 14, col. 1 (the decline in the availability of
rental apartments in many neighborhoods makes the eviction of tenants as a result of
eviction conversion plans all the worse); Saft, Cooperative-Condominium Conversions, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 22, 1980, at 1, col. 4; see Sullivan, No Vacancy, CITY LIMITS,
May 1982, at 26. New York City's tri-annual housing and vacancy rate survey found
that while New York City has a stable housing stock, the vacancy rate for rental units
decreased from 2.95 to 2.13 % during the 1978-1981 period. Id. at 26-27; see Daniels,
Rate of Vacancy For Rentals Fell 30% in 3 Years, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1982, at B1,
col. 6. Only 42,000 of the 1.9 million apartments in New York City were vacant and
available in 1981. Id.
91. TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON LIVING COSTS AND THE ECONOMY, STATE
OF NEw YORK, REPORT ON HOUSING AND RENTS TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE (1974) [hereinafter cited as LIVING COSTS COMM'N REPORT].
92. Id. § B-8, at 17.
93. Andrew Stein is currently Manhattan Borough President.
94. LIVING COSTS COMM'N REPORT, supra note 91, § E-VI.-5, at 5-6.
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tent, however, these objections were remedied by subsequent legislation.95 In addition, with regard to the eviction of tenants, the Goodman-Grannis legislation permits noneviction conversion plans and
increases the minimum percentage of tenants required to purchase to
fifty-one percent.96 This largely negates the Commission's objections
to conversion on the grounds that it displaces tenants.
Another basis of opposition to apartment conversion cited by the
Stein Commission is that the sponsor and purchaser may benefit to the
detriment of the community as a whole. The Commission's viewpoint,
however, is in contrast to both the New York State policy supporting
conversion of residential rental apartments to cooperative housing and
the position of the New York State Temporary Commission on Rental
Housing.9 7 The state considers conversion to contribute to the supply
of sound housing as well as to the preservation, stabilization and
improvement of neighborhoods.9 8 The Temporary Commission of
Rental Housing concluded that "[a]s a matter of housing policy, it
should be the declared objective of the State of New York to encourage
conversion of residential property to

. .

.cooperative status, with ad-

equate safeguards for the rights of both the tenants and the sponsor of
the conversion." 99
Additionally, a comprehensive national study of conversion of
rental housing to cooperative and condominium housing by the Department of Housing and Urban Development specifically addressed
the impact of the conversion process on the availability of rental units.
This report, completed in 1980, presented a statistical study covering
the years 1970-1979. It concluded that on the national level only
1.31 % and in New York City only 0.72 % of available occupied rental
housing stock was lost due to conversion. 100 Based on these findings, it
95. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eeee(1)(b) (noneviction plan), (1)(c) (eviction
plan now requires 51% of bona fide tenants agree to purchase their apartments),
(2)(e) (anti-warehousing provision); see also N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 18.1(g)
(1982) (anti- warehousing regulation).
96. See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
97. See notes 98-99 infra and accompanying text.
98. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
99. 2 RENTAL HOUSING COMM'N REPORT, supra note 35, ch. 2, at 2-111. The basis
for this conclusion included the following points: (1) many informed commentators
indicated that the conversion of residential rental housing was the best hope for long
range preservation of housing stock, (2) New York and other locations have found
that such conversions generate pride of ownership, upgrading of properties and
stabilization of neighborhoods. According to the commission, the municipality gains
from the added impetus that such conversions give to maintenance and improvement
of residential buildings as well as from full payment of real estate taxes and an
increase in the assessed valuation of properties that have undergone conversion. Id.
100. HUD STUDY, supra note 1, IV-7 (table IV-2).
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appears that the impact on the supply of occupied rental units due to
conversion has been rather limited. Traditional concerns with the
actual impact of cooperative conversion may therefore not be nearly
as justified as some observers have indicated.10 ' This is due in part to
the advent of noneviction conversion plans. Noneviction plans, however, present problems for tenants which can only be understood in
the context of the legislative history from which the plans were derived.
V. Cooperative Conversion Legislation Prior to 1982
The initial state legislation in the cooperative housing area, General
Business Law section 352-e, 102 was enacted in 1960 and directed at
the monitoring of real estate syndication transactions. 103 This legislation, still effective today, was enacted after a three-year investigation
by the Attorney General's office which uncovered abuses by certain
offerors of real estate securities that resulted in substantial losses to the
investing public.10 4 These abuses included misleading advertising and
fraudulent offerings of real estate syndication interest to the public,
particularly small investors. 0 5 Section 352-e set forth basic disclosure
requirements for an apartment conversion offering statement including sponsor submission to the Attorney General for approval of apartment conversion. 106 This legislation did not, however, require that a
landlord-developer, in either an eviction or noneviction plan, attain
any purchasers for the offered cooperative units from existing tenants.
It was not until 1962 that landlord-developers in New York City
were required to obtain purchase agreements from a percentage of the
existing tenants in a targeted rent controlled building before an evic-

101. See note 100 supra and accompanying text; contra note 90 supra and accompanying text.
102. 1960 New York Laws ch. 987.
103. Memorandum for the Governor from Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz
(Apr. 5, 1960). At that time the real estate syndication transactions involved issuance
of securities of greater than $100,000,000 a year in New York State. Id. Real Estate
syndication is a method used to enable investors to own large properties jointly; the
investors may be limited partners, stockholders or bondholders often assembled by a
manager who acquires property and offers the public participation. State Considers
Syndicate Curbs, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1958, § 8, at 1, col. 4.
104. Memorandum for the Governor from Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz
(Apr. 5, 1960).
105. State Considers Syndicate Curbs, supra note 103; Memorandum for the
Governor from Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz (Apr. 9, 1958); Supplemental
Memorandum for the Governor from Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz (Apr. 16,
1958).
106. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1982-1983).
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tion plan may be approved.107 In that year, the New York City Rent
Control and Rehabilitation Law required at least thirty-five percent
of the current tenants agree to purchase their apartment. The provi08
sion, however, did not apply to noneviction plans.1
Attention was focused on the need for legislation in noneviction
plans during the attempt in 1974 to convert the 12,000 unit Parkchester complex in Bronx, New York to condominiums. 09 During this
conversion, it became apparent that nonpurchasing remaining tenants
in a noneviction plan are subject to abuses, which may not reach the
level of problems associated with eviction plans, but are nonetheless
unacceptable. Specifically, residents who chose not to purchase their
apartment were allegedly harassed and services or facilities were not
provided on a nondiscriminatory basis."l 0 This conversion effort, one
of the earliest attempts at a noneviction plan, resulted in both a great
deal of litigation"' and tenant pressure for protective legislation.
As a result of this pressure, the legislature enacted the GoodmanDearie law in 1974. 112 The Goodman-Dearie law required that thirty-

107. See New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations § 55(c)(3) (a), reprinted in
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS tit. 23, ch. 4 app. at 543 (McKinney 1974).
108. Note also that the 35% purchase agreement provision for eviction plans
became applicable to rent stabilized buildings as part of the 1969 Rent Stabilization

Law.
N.Y.

NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. YY (1975 & Supp. 1982-1983),
UNCONSOL. LAWS tit. 23, ch. 4 app. at 587 (McKinney 1974 &

reprinted in
Supp. 1982-

1983). Prior to the Goodman-Grannis legislation in 1982, see notes 152-65 infra and
accompanying text, the Rent Stabilization Law covered only eviction type cooperative plans. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. YY, § YY51-6.0(c)(9)(a) (1975), reprinted in N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS tit. 23, ch. 4 app. at 599, amended by 1982 N.Y.
Laws ch. 555, § 7, codified in N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eeee note at 34 (McKinney
Supp. 1982-1983).

109. Oser, Non-Eviction Conversion Under Way at Glen Oaks Village, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 19, 1980, at B10, col. 1; Lehner & Sweet, supra note 87.
110. Lehner & Sweet, supra note 87, at 25, col. 3.
111. See Parkchester Apts. Co. v. Lefkowitz, 41 N.Y.2d 987, 363 N.E.2d 712, 395
N.Y.S.2d 162 (1977), aff'g 51 A.D.2d 277, 381 N.Y.S.2d 230 (1st Dep't 1976);
Parkchester Apts. Co. v. Lefkowitz, 36 N.Y.2d 688, 325 N.E.2d 870, 366 N.Y.S.2d
409 (1975), aff'g 44 A.D.2d 442, 355 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1st Dep't 1974); Whalen v.
Lefkowitz, 36 N.Y.2d 75, 324 N.E.2d 536, 365 N.Y.S.2d 150 (1975), afJ'g 44 A.D.2d
442, 355 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1st Dep't 1974).
112. 1974 N.Y. Laws ch. 1021 (extended one year from 1976 to 1977 and then
allowed to expire). See also Lehner & .Sweet, supra note 87, at 25, col. 2. It should
therefore not be surprising that Goodman-Dearie contained the most restrictive
provisions for apartment conversion ever enacted in New York State. This is reflected
in the dramatic decrease in the number of conversions during the 1974-1977 period.
Id., at 34, col. 1. See Judge Jasen's dissent in Parkchester Apts. Co. v. Lefkowitz, 41
N.Y.2d 987, 994, 363 N.E.2d 712, 716, 395 N.Y.S.2d 162, 166 (1977) for a discussion
of the factors leading to Goodman-Dearie. The judge characterized the Parkchester
conversion attempt as typifying the kind of situation Goodman-Dearie was intended
to correct.
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five percent of tenants in occupancy agree to purchase their apartments for either an eviction or noneviction plan to be accepted for
filing by the Attorney General's office. 113 This statute has been credited as the reason for the dramatic decrease in apartment conversions
during the 1974-1977 period. 1 4 After a one-year extension from 1976
to 1977, the Goodman-Dearie law was allowed to expire due to the
pressure from landlord-developers over its allegedly restrictive effect." 5 As a result, landlord-developers in New York City, subject only
to the rent control and stabilization laws, were required to obtain
purchase agreements from thirty-five percent of existing tenants for
eviction plans only; there were no such requirements for noneviction
6
plans. 11
The Director of the Real Estate Financing Bureau established
guidelines in the early 1970's governing noneviction plans in New
York City" 7 which became reactivated after the Goodman-Dearie
law expired in 1977."11 Under these guidelines, landlord/developers
had to obtain commitments to purchase at least fifteen percent of the

113. 1974 N.Y. Laws ch. 1021, § 2-a(1)(i); 2 RENTAL HOUSING COMM'N REPORT,
supra note 35, ch. 2, at 2-17.
114. 2 RENTAL HOUSING COMM'N REPORT, supra note 35, ch. 2, at 2-17 to 2-19;
Lehner & Sweet, supra note 87, at 34, col. 1. Representatives of the real estate
industry in effect argued that Goodman-Dearie put a halt to cooperative conversions
because of reluctance to file cooperative conversion plans under the restrictive Goodman-Dearie ground rules. Id. Tenant interests placed the blame for the drop in
cooperative conversions during the 1974-1977 period on economic conditions as well
as the landlord/developer decision to refrain from cooperative conversions in the
hope Goodman-Dearie would not be extended another year. Id.
115. Lehner & Sweet, supra note 87, at 34, col. 1. Goodman-Dearie was attacked
by owner interests as "overkill." Id. It had also been attacked previously as effectively
putting an end to all building conversions. Letter from Real Estate Board of New
York, Inc. to Governor Hugh Carey (July 1, 1976). Goodman-Dearie was also
depicted as specifically limiting voluntary apartment conversions (i.e., noneviction
type conversions). Letter from Rent Stabilization Ass'n of New York City, Inc. to
Hon. Judah Gribetz, Executive Chamber, State Capitol (July 12, 1976). In addition
it was also opposed as doing greater harm to condominium and cooperative housing.
Letter from New York State Bar Ass'n to Counsel to Governor Hugh Carey (July 13,
1976).
116. See note 108 supra.
117. Telephone Interview with David Clurman, attorney, Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon, former Director of Real Estate Financing Bureau and Assistant Attorney General, New York State Dep't of Law (Mar. 7, 1983); see note 89
supra.
118. See text accompanying note 115 supra. The Goodman-Dearie law requirement that 35 % of tenants in occupancy agree to purchase their apartments in either
an eviction or noneviction cooperative conversion plan exceeded the Attorney General's policy requiring 15% of tenants or outsiders to purchase their apartments in a
noneviction conversion plan. Consequently, the Attorney General's policy was unnecessary during the 1974-1977 period that Goodman-Dearie was law.
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units in a targeted building from either current tenants or outsiders.II"
The Attorney General's guidelines for New York City did not include
the "insider" purchase requirement found under the three county
legislation.120 As a result the types of problems encountered during the
noneviction attempt to convert the Parkchester houses remained unaddressed.
Subsequent tenant-oriented legislation addressed certain aspects of
the noneviction problem as well as other ancillary problems with the
conversion law. However, it was not until passage of the GoodmanGrannis legislation in 1982121 that the Attorney General's noneviction
guidelines were formalized.
In 1978, the New York State legislature enacted section 352-eee of
the General Business Law providing better protection for tenants in
Nassau, Rockland and Westchester counties122 facing a noneviction
conversion type plan than that available under the New York City
Rent Stabilization or Rent Control Laws.' 23 The three county legislation, which is still in effect, requires that fifteen percent of tenants in
occupancy of a building targeted for conversion agree to purchase
their apartments in order for the Attorney General's office to accept a
124
noneviction plan for filing.

In 1979, the Lehner-Flynn bill created a new section 352-eeee
which was applicable only to New York City.125 Under Lehner-Flynn,

non-purchasing senior citizen tenants earning less than $30,000 annu-

119. R. ABRAMS & J. ROSENBERG, COOPERATIVE AND CONDOMINIUM CONVERSION
HANDBOOK 28 (1982).
120. Interview with Jane Rosenberg, Assistant Attorney General, New York State
Dep't of Law, in New York City (Sept. 13, 1982).
121. See notes 152-53 infra and accompanying text.

122. 1978 New York Laws ch. 544.
123. Id.; see note 108 supra and accompanying text.
124. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eee(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983). Following the 1977 legislative session there was clamor for some kind of protection for

suburban tenants, few of whom had any protection once a cooperative conversion
plan was filed other than for fraud or failure of a sponsor to make full disclosure.
Once a conversion plan became effective, few had protection for continued occupancy. E. Lehner & D. Sweet, Co-op Conversion Law; Impact in Suburbia,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 20, 1978, at 1, col. 2.
In response, the State Assembly passed a bill similar to legislation that eventually
passed both houses, but which also included New York City. Id., at 7, col. 1.
However, when the State Senate refused to act on the bill passed by the Assembly,
the Assembly concluded that the urgency of legislation for the suburbs required
passage of the Senate version that excluded New York City. This effectively eliminated New York City from the insider purchaser requirement in noneviction plans
which was made available to Westchester, Rockland, and Nassau County resident
tenants. Id.
125. 1979 N.Y. Laws ch. 432, § 2(8).
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ally were protected from eviction resulting from an apartment conversion. 126 Additionally, an anti-warehousing provision was added in
order to discourage an excessive number or length of vacancies. 127 This
provision was intended to combat the landlord/developer reduction of
apartments actually required by the New York City Rent Control and
Rent Stabilization Laws to be purchased by tenants in an eviction
plan (i.e. thirty-five percent).
A provision was also enacted requiring that as long as the sponsor
continues to control the cooperative board the same managing agent
must service and provide equivalent services to the non-purchasing as
well as purchasing tenants. 2 8 Finally, the bill established the Attorney
General's power to restrain the sale of the dwelling unit of a tenant
who has been subjected to harassment, 12 9 and set forth a new formula
for calculating the required number of purchasers. 130
Section 352-eeee was amended in 1980131 to provide additional
tenant protections. However, the statute still failed to address the
problems associated with noneviction conversion plans. Under the
1980 amendments, eligible handicapped persons could no longer be
2
evicted as a result of the filing of an eviction type conversion plan.13
Furthermore, the maximum annual income allowed for senior citizens
protected from eviction was raised from $30,000 to $50,000.133 A
procedure for periodically posting the percentage of purchasing tenants was also adopted. 134 Finally, the Attorney General was given the
exclusive right to determine eligibility for handicapped and senior
citizen status, reviewable only in an Article 78 proceeding. 3
126. Id. § 2(l)(e). It must have been the senior citizen's primary residence for at
least two years prior to the date the Attorney General accepted the conversion plan
for filing. Id. To be eligible, the tenant had to be 62 years of age or older on the date
the Attorney General accepted the plan for filing. Id.
127. Id. § 2(3)(a).
128. Id. § 2(4).
129. Id. § 2(5).
130. Id. § 3(a), (f).
131. 1980 N.Y. Laws chs. 754-756.
132. Id. ch. 754, §§ 1(f), 2(d)(i).
133. Id. ch. 756, § 1(e).
134. Id.ch. 755, § 2(d).
135. Id. ch. 754, § 2(4). One commentator saw these 1980 amendments as indicative of a shift from New York's full disclosure statutory approach to apartment
conversion to the "fairness test" applied by other states such as Texas and California.
Saft, supra note 90, at 1, col. 2; 6, col. 2. A subject of debate is whether this
comprehensive "full disclosure" statute is the best approach. There have been questions whether this disclosure approach really helps the prospective purchaser or
buries him in a sea of detail. Zinman, Condominium Investments and the Institutional Lender-A Re-View, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 749, 782 (1974). New York makes
little attempt at direct regulation but focuses on disclosure. It treats cooperative
interests like securities. Miller, CooperativeApartments: Real Estate or Securities, 45
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VI. Judicial Support for "No-Buy" Pledges
Beyond legislative measures, tenants gained additional protection
in the form of "no-buy" pledges. 136 No-buy pledges exist where tenants
agree to bind themselves not to purchase apartments from a sponsor of
a cooperative conversion plan. 3 7 The validity of such agreements was
upheld in 136 East 64th Street Tenant Association v. Bloom. 138 In
Bloom the New York State Supreme Court enjoined five tenants from
purchasing cooperative shares pending a final determination of the
validity of the no-buy agreement. 139 The plaintiff tenant association,
in opposition to the proposed cooperative conversion, obtained signatures from tenants on no-buy pledges which were to become effective
after seventy percent of the tenants signed. 140 The plaintiff contended
41
that it had more than the seventy percent required for validity.
After signing the no-buy agreement, five tenants agreed to the conversion. The sponsor included these tenants in calculating the required
thirty-five percent needed to proceed with an eviction plan. 14 The
court found that, as part of the no-buy agreement, a signatory consented to injunctive relief in the event or threat of breach of the
agreement. 143 Both the lower court and the appellate division noted
B.U.L. REV. 465, 487 (1965); Levine, supra note 27, at 496-97. New York does not
have a "fairness" or "feasibility" test and so may not refuse to file offering statements
because of high prices, risk of loss, or unfair terms not in contravention of law. Id. at
498.
136. Saxe, Developments in Law of Co-op, Condominium Conversions, N.Y.L.J.,
Nov. 4, 1982, at 1, col. 3; 26, col. 1; Henry, Pledges Are Key Tool in Co-op Deals,
N.Y. Times, July 11, 1982, § 12 (Real Estate), at 1, col. 1; 12, col. 4. The preponderance of lawyers say properly written no-buy pledges are enforceable. Id. However,
some lawyers argue that this is still an open question. Id.
137. Henry, supra note 136, at 1, col. 1. It is a written agreement. Id.
138. N.Y.L.J., June 17, 1981, at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County June 16, 1981),
modified, 86 A.D.2d 808, 452 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1st Dep't 1982) (the appellate court
affirmed the grant of a preliminary injunction except as against the State Attorney
General). The court, in its decision, stated that" 'no-buy pledge' agreements are held
to be valid and legally binding on the signatories ..
" N.Y.L.J., June 17, 1981, at
6, col. 5. See also Goodwin, 'No-Buy' Pledges by Tenants Are Binding, Judge Decides, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1981, at B3, col. 6.
139. 136 East 64th St. Tenants' Ass'n v. Bloom, N.Y.L.J., June 17, 1981, at 6, col.
3, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County June 16, 1981), modified, 86 A.D.2d 808, 452
N.Y.S.2d 578 (1st Dep't 1982).
140. N.Y.L.J., June 17, 1981, at 6, col. 3.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. This may be an important factor distinguishing this decision from the
decision in Vermeer Comm. for Fair Options v. Guterman, N.Y.L.J., May 13, 1980,
at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County May 12, 1980), aff'd mem., 77 A.D.2d 505, 429
N.Y.S.2d 980 (1st Dep't 1980), discussed at notes 145-50 infra and accompanying
text. As the lower court in Bloom said, "the signatories to the agreement are put on
notice that a violation of the terms of the pledge can have serious consequences."
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the certainty of irreparable harm to other signatories of the plan if the
eviction conversion plan was allowed to proceed. 144
The Bloom decision followed an earlier case holding no-buy pledges
not to be legally binding on the signatories. 145 In Vermeer Committee
for Fair Options v. Guterman,14 the supreme court denied the plaintiff tenants' motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin another
group of tenants and the sponsor from effecting a conversion.1 47 The
plaintiffs alleged that they represented forty-five percent of the eligible tenants and that the sponsor had reached the minimum of thirtyfive percent through purchases by tenants who had previously signed
8
a no-buy pledge.14

In Guterman, the appellate division upheld the lower court ruling.1 49 The lower court had held that a preliminary injunction was
inappropriate as damages were available. 150 In Bloom, however, the
no-buy agreements contained specific language providing for injunctive relief should the agreement be broken.151 Therefore, it seems that
no-buy pledges, carefully drafted to provide injunctive relief in the
event of breach, will be effective in halting a conversion if the minimum percentage of required tenants was reached by including
breaching pledgees.

N.Y.L.J., June 17, 1981, at6, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County June 16, 1981). The court
added
[r]ealizing the uniqueness inherent in realty, the signatory further consents
to the granting of injunctive relief as a matter of right, without notice in
the event of a breach. Here again, the language is clear that the intent of
the parties . . . was not to be limited to an action at law for dam. ..
Id. ages
144. Id. The First Department stated this in terms of "the uncertainty to which all
the tenants are subject as to whether they are going to lose or safeguard their homes
on the one hand, or perhaps the opportunity of a large profit on the other." 86
A.D.2d at 809, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 580. The court went on to say "[w]e do not think
tenants should be required to make decisions of investments of very large sums of
money while under such uncertainty and fear" and therefore granted the preliminary
injunction. Id.
145. Vermeer Comm. for Fair Options v. Guterman, N.Y.L.J., May 13, 1980, at
6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County May 12, 1980), aff'd mem, 77 A.D.2d 505, 429
N.Y.S.2d 980 (1st Dep't 1980). The lower court denied a preliminary injunction on
the ground that damages would be available. Id., col. 4.
146. Id., col. 3.
147. Id., col. 4.
148. Id., col. 3.
149. 77 A.D.2d 505, 429 N.Y.S.2d 980 (1st Dep't 1980).
150. N.Y.L.J., May 13, 1980, at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County May 12, 1980).
151. N.Y.L.J., June 17, 1981, at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County June 16, 1981).
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VII. The Goodman-Grannis Bill: Its Content and Criticisms
In 1982, the New York State Legislature enacted the most comprehensive cooperative conversion statute affecting New York City since
the Goodman-Dearie law. The Goodman-Grannis legislation15 2 replaces prior section 352-eeee of the General Business Law and supersedes the New York City Rent Stabilization and Rent Control Laws.
The new law, which expires on July 1, 1985, s3 imposes a formal
fifteen percent purchase agreement requirement for noneviction
plans. Unfortunately, the Goodman-Grannis legislation, as did the
informal guidelines formerly used by the Attorney General's office,
did not include an insider purchaser requirement for noneviction
plans similar to that required in the three suburban county legislation,1 4 thus leaving a major loophole in the New York City law. This
omission, which overshadows the fact that the Goodman-Grannis
legislation increases the purchase agreement requirement from thirtyfive percent to fifty-one percent for eviction plans,15 5 permits a landlord/developer to use non-tenants to meet the purchase requirement in
noneviction plans.156 The failure of this provision to include an "in152. 1982 N.Y. Laws ch. 555.
153. Id. § 10, codified at N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §352-eeee note (McKinney Supp.
1982-1983).
154. See McKee, supra note 10; N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eeee(l)(b) (McKinney
Supp. 1982-1983). Goodman-Grannis represents a compromise between the State
Senate and the Assembly. Dionne Jr., Albany Meets Issues of Co-ops and Lofts, N.Y.
Times, July 18, 1982, § 8 (Real Estate), at 7, col. 1; Oser, Protections Widened in
New York Conversions, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1982, § 8 (Real Estate), at 7, col. 1;
McKee, supra note 10. Republican State Senators from New York City were under
pressure from their constituents to pass a co-op bill. Id. The Assembly had previously
proposed increasing the minimum number of tenant purchasers required for approval of an eviction type conversion plan to a majority. See, e.g., N.Y. Times,
Jan.10, 1982, at 30, col. 1.; Williams, Rules on Co-op Conversions Tightened in
Assembly, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1981, § 2, at 4, col. 3. Although the Assembly finally
achieved the 51% milestone for eviction type conversion plans they were "out manuevered" by the State Senate which gave up nothing in the area of noneviction
plans. McKee, supra note 10, at 28.
155. The Attorney General's office had been supporting a majority requirement
for eviction type conversion plans since at least 1969. Oser, Conversion to Cooperatives for Housing in the City, N.Y. Times, April 24, 1980, § 2, at B14, col. 1; the
Attorney General made such a proposal as recently as June 1982. Letter from
Attorney General Robert Abrams to Warren N. Anderson, Majority Leader of the
New York State Senate (June 20, 1982); Memorandum for the Governor from Attorney General Robert Abrams (July 12, 1982).
156. The law requires that in noneviction conversion plans the outside purchasers
be "bona fide purchasers who represent that they intend that they or one or more
members of their immediate family intend to occupy the unit, when it becomes
vacant." N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eeee(1)(b). In effect they are signing an affidavit
that they are not speculators. McKee, supra note 10, at 28. At the same time the
Attorney General's staff recognizes the difficulty of monitoring their affidavits. Inter-
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sider" purchaser requirement, permitting a landlord/developer to convert a building without the support of any existing tenants, caused a
leading tenant representative to characterize the Goodman-Grannis
legislation as having "fail[ed] utterly to address the major loophole in
5 7
the law." 1
Three basic criticisms have arisen concerning the Goodman-Grannis legislation. First, both tenant groups and the Attorney General's
office are concerned that. Goodman-Grannis will encourage more
noneviction plans 158 due to the increased percentage requirements for
eviction plans. Additionally, as a result of the courts' approval of nobuy pledges and the ease with which a sufficient number of tenants
may be attained to block an eviction plan under Goodman-Grannis
(fifty percent as opposed to sixty-six percent under prior law), landlord/developers can be expected to take the course of least resistancenoneviction plans.
view with Jane Rosenberg, Assistant Attorney General, Real Estate Financing Bureau, New York State Dep't of Law (September 13, 1982).
In addition, in order to avoid sponsor collusion, the non-tenant purchasers in a
noneviction plan are required to be bona fide purchasers and are not allowed to be
related to the sponsor or each other. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 18.5(e)(6)(ii),
(e)(2)(ii)(1982). It should be noted that there exists an exception for sponsors, relatives or associates if the sponsor submits proof satisfactory to the Attorney General's
office establishing the purchaser as a bona fide tenant. Id.
157. McKee, supra note 10, at 28. Despite the controversy surrounding the Goodman-Grannis legislation as it relates to the noneviction plan, the legislation did
include a number of important tenant protections in addition to the new 51 %
requirement for tenant purchasers in an eviction type plan. For instance, senior
citizens and tenants 62 years old and older are exempt from eviction regardless of
income or length of residency. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eeee(1)(f), (2)(d)(i). In
addition the definition of eligible disabled person was liberalized to allow some
gainful employment and still be exempt from eviction. Id. § 352-eeee(1)(g), (2)(d)(i).
Non-purchasing tenants are permitted to stay in a converted building for the longer
of either three years or the length of the lease when an eviction type conversion plan
is implemented. Id. § 352-eeee(2)(d)(ii). Furthermore, prospective purchasing tenants gained the right to have their representatives such as architects and engineers
inspect the buildings. Id., § 352-eeee(2)(f). Finally, the Attorney General was given
increased powers to combat harassment through court orders blocking not just the
apartment sale where the harassment occurred but the conversion of the whole
building. Id. § 352-eeee(2), (4).
.158. This further compounds the already existing trend toward noneviction plans,
see note 68 supra and accompanying text; Henry, Occupied Units Lure Investors,
N.Y. Times, May 30, 1982, § 8 (Real Estate), at 1, col. 1. This trend is based on the
lure of tax benefits, calculations regarding life expectancy and the notion that at the
right price occupied units are a good investment. Id. While the precise number of
investors is elusive, clearly the market for occupied units as investments has broadened beyond real estate professionals. Id., at 11, col. 2. However, Scott Greathead,
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Real Estate Financing Bureau, New York
State Dep't of Law believes that accompanying this trend toward noneviction plans
are unscrupulous investors who work on the assumption they can harass tenants out
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This shift to noneviction plans is particularly troublesome to the
Attorney General's office because it raises the real prospect of tenant
harassment, unattended buildings and lack of day-to-day maintenance. 1 59 In an eviction plan, fifty-one percent of the tenants must
agree to purchase their apartments. Thus, the tenants gain control of
the building. By contrast, in a noneviction plan, after fifteen percent
of statutorily defined "bona fide"' 0 purchasers subscribe to buy
apartments, the remaining eighty-five percent of the apartments may
be sold either to speculators who never intend to occupy a unit in the
building or to outside purchasers who intend to reside in the cooperative unit as soon as it becomes vacant. Initially, it is the landlord/
developer, in his desire to fully co-op his building by selling his units,
who has the incentive to harass non-purchasing tenants into purchasing or vacating their apartments."" This harassment subsequently
may be compounded if the landlord/developer sells the occupied units
either to speculators concerned with the marketability of their invest62
ment or to outside purchasers who desire immediate occupancy.1
Second, noneviction plans may lead to unique living arrangements
in which a traditional landlord or cooperative board does not exist. In
addition, tenants in the same building may be renting and owning
apartments simultaneously. A difficult question arises: who is responsible for the long-term interests of the building? Since eighty-five
percent of the owners are not required to live in the building at any
time, they may not have the same concern for building maintenance
as occupying tenants. This may lead to a number of unattended
buildings.16 3 Even if buildings remain occupied, the absence of a
controlling body leaves tenants responsible for the repair and maintenance of their apartments and common areas. 164 Third, the possibility
of their units and then sell them. Id., at col. 4. According to Greathead, as
"'thousands of minilandlords' " take ownership of apartments in New York City, a
'plethora of abuses' " are feared in the area of tenant harassment. Id., at col. 3.
159. Interview with Jane Rosenberg, Assistant Attorney General, Real Estate
Financing Bureau, New York State Dep't of Law, in New York City (Sept. 13, 1982).
160. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eeee(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
161. See Lehner & Sweet, supra note 87, at 35, col. 4. The authors discuss the fact
that in such noneviction plans harassment of non-purchasing tenants by "unscrupulous" landlords becomes more significant because it is the only way the tenants can be
forced to move. Id.
162. The fear expressed by Scott Greathead, Assistant Attorney General in charge
of the Real Estate Financing Bureau, New York State Dep't of Law, is that as these
new "minilandlords" take ownership there will be numerous instances of tenant
harassment. Henry, supra note 158.
163. Interview with Jane Rosenberg, Assistant Attorney General, Real Estate
Financing Bureau, New York State Dep't of Law, in New York City (Sept. 13. 1982).
164. Id.
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exists that a sponsor may choose not to sell but to rent apartments as
they are vacated. By so doing, a sponsor is no longer under rent
regulation.' 5 Thus, a sponsor may circumvent the rent laws and
escalate rents at will.
VIIi. Recent Cooperative Legislation
In an effort to address the problems associated with the noneviction
approach of cooperative housing conversion incorporated into the
Goodman-Grannis legislation, three bills have been proposed recently7
66
in the New York State Assembly. These bills, A.5776,1 A.5482,16
and A.3889,' 68 are currently in committee.
Assembly bill 5776 would repeal section 352-eee and amend section
352-eeee of the General Business Law. It would provide statewide
local option legislation in line with that provided in New York City, as
well as a new definition of a noneviction plan' 69 to be effective where
70
fifteen percent of tenants in occupancy purchase their apartments.'
This would replace the current provision applicable to New York City
which allows either outsiders or tenants in occupancy to compose the
7
fifteen percent bona fide purchasers required in a noneviction plan.' '
Assembly bill 5482 would amend section 352-eeee of the General
Business Law to provide that a noneviction plan may not be declared
effective until thirty-five percent of all dwelling units in a building are
purchased by tenants. 172 An additional sixteen percent of either tenants or outsiders would be required to purchase apartments in order
for the noneviction plan to become effective. '73
Assembly bill 3889 would change the definition of a noneviction
plan in New York City and Nassau, Rockland and Westchester Coun-

165. Id.; The New York City Rent Stabilization Law does not apply to converted
cooperative buildings. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. YY, § YY51-3.0 (1975 &
Supp. 1982-1983), reprinted in N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS tit. 23, ch. 4 app. at 589
(McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1982-1983). The local rent control law is inapplicable since
as apartments are vacated they are shifted in the rent stabilized category. Telephone
Interview with Jane Rosenberg, Assistant Attorney General, Real Estate Financing
Bureau, New York State Dep't of Law (Mar. 4, 1983). While the rental of vacant
apartments by the developer of the cooperative itself is possible in an eviction type
conversion, this is not the traditional approach taken in such a plan. Id.
166. A. 5776, 206th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. Legis. Record & Index 1983).
167. A. 5482, 206th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. Legis. Record & Index 1983).
168. A. 3889, 206th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. Legis. Record & Index 1983).
169. A. 5776, 206th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. Legis. Record & Index 1983).
170. Id,
171. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eeee(1)(b).
172. A. 5482, 206th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. Legis. Record & Index 1983).
173. Id.
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ties.1 74 The bill provides that twenty-five percent of tenants must
purchase their apartments in order for the noneviction plan to be
successful. 175
All three bills would revise the purchaser requirement in noneviction type conversion plans such that a percentage of tenants would
have input in a determination concerning a noneviction conversion.
However, A.5776 has the greatest chance of passing in the State
Assembly and Senate due to its realistic approach to the problems
identified above. This bill most closely resembles section 352-eee of
the General Business Law covering Nassau, Rockland and Westchester Counties. By contrast, the other two bills provide an unrealistic
and unnecessarily high level of input for tenants. Assembly bill 5776's
fifteen percent tenant purchaser requirement would provide the basis
for tenant organization without unduly restricting the landlord developer from utilizing the perhaps less attractive and less marketable
noneviction approach.
IX. Conclusion
The controversy over noneviction plans is part of the continuous
struggle between landlord and tenant interests in New York State
which began when Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz recognized
the need to prevent large real estate syndications from taking unfair
advantage of small investors. Since passage of the first legislation
directed toward real estate syndication in 1960, there have been shifts
from broad tenant protection- in cooperative conversion with the
Goodman-Dearie legislation, to minimal tenant protection when
Goodman-Dearie was allowed to expire in 1977. Since 1977, there has
been a return to increased tenant protection with passage of the three
county legislation, the 1979 Lehner-Flynn bill and amendments to
Lehner-Flynn in 1980.
What makes the most recent legislation, Goodman-Grannis, unique
to this developing trend in tenant protection is that while it gives
tenants the desired fifty-one percent minimum tenant purchaser requirement for eviction type conversion plans, it codifies the outsider
purchaser requirement in noneviction plans.
The impact of the noneviction approach to cooperative conversion
in New York City is best evidenced by the potential element of speculation. At risk is an increasing number of buildings deteriorating as a
result of an increase in absentee landlord/developers. While it is argu174. A.3889, 206th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. Legis. Record & Index 1983).
175. Id.
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able that a developer may continue to provide minimal services and
cosmetic repairs to remaining tenants to maintain the saleability of an
apartment, after conversion it is unlikely that substantive maintenance will continue. More important is the economic incentive on the
part of these speculators to remove tenants from their apartments
illegally by harassment and failure to provide services. These tactics
become all the more powerful if landlord/developers in a noneviction
conversion plan do not meet organized tenant opposition. However, a
powerful tenant movement which may include a threat of a rent strike
may discourage potential outside purchasers concerned with return on
their investment. 76 Even so, an assistant attorney general recently
characterized noneviction cooperative conversion plans as a "time
' 77
bomb ready to explode."'
However one describes noneviction plans clearly, the GoodmanGrannis legislation has failed to provide the level of protection to
tenants facing noneviction cooperative conversion in New York City
as has been provided for tenants living in Nassau, Rockland and
Westchester Counties. These counties, by virtue of their requirement
that landlord developers show that existing tenants will purchase at
least fifteen percent of the apartment units in a targeted building,
have foreclosed the potential disruption associated with the Goodman-Grannis law. Goodman-Grannis, by providing that non-tenants
alone can satisfy the fifteen percent requirement, has created a situation where tenants will have little to say concerning the conversion of
the building in which they live. Without any leverage in a noneviction
conversion plan, tenants, to a great extent, will be at the conversion
sponsor's mercy. Adequate protection for tenants of the City of New
York demands legislation similar to that presently effective in Nassau,
Rockland and Westchester Counties. The existing law should be
amended to reflect the tenants' needs by requiring that the fifteen
percent of tenants required for a noneviction conversion in the City of
New York be drawn solely from tenants in occupancy of a target
building.
Robert M. Nelson
176. It has also been suggested that this powerful tenant tool may be used as
leverage to halt a noneviction plan since the sponsor wants to sell as many units as
possible in a short period of time. See Find Tenants Bargain Well In Non-Eviction
Co-op Plans, Real Estate Weekly, Aug. 30, 1982, at 1, col. 1. However, in a
noneviction plan, no-buy pledges are of questionable value because the percentage
required is low and the sponsor can sell vacant apartments to outsiders. Henry, supra
note 136, at 1, col. 1.
177. Interview with Jane Rosenberg, Assistant Attorney General, New York State
Dep't of Law, in New York City (September 13, 1982).

